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AMERICA'S INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND FOREIGN POLICY

BY GEORGE LOUIS BEER.

The present world-wide war has brought home to all thinking men the firm conviction that the existing system of international relations is out of harmony with the fundamental facts of modern life. As a result of the application of scientific discoveries to means of communication, mankind has, during the past hundred years, become a unit in a concrete sense never before realized. But within this all-embracing unity there is a considerably more clearly defined entity composed of the states of western civilization. Despite marked differences of gravest significance, these states have been developing on parallel, and even on converging, lines. Art, science, literature, and philosophy have become international, but far more binding than the ties thus established are those resulting from the commercial and financial interdependence of the western world. These ever growing relations necessitated some regulation, and the system slowly elaborated in response to this need is embodied both in a vast series of specific treaties and in the ill-defined precedents of interstate usage known as international law. The present war, both in its outbreak and in its course, has furnished concrete proof that this system is woefully inadequate.

The essential difficulty is that the underlying facts of interstate relations find inadequate expression in existing international institutions. While the world has become in an actual sense a unit, there is no real organization binding together the constituent aggregates.¹ In the political world of today, the state is the final reality, and the prevailing concept of its nature must be radically changed before the inchoate world-community can take effective shape. There is no *vinculum juris* binding the sovereign states together. Anarchy is still the dominant characteristic of interstate relations. For, according to the current doctrine, the state is

¹ "Idealists sigh for the Comity of Nations. But it is already in existence. It is only the Comity of States which seems impossible." C. Delisle Burns, *The Morality of Nations*, pp. 228, 229.

responsible to no superior and because of its sovereignty—naturally unlimited—it is the sole judge of its actions. The repudiation of a solemn treaty or the violation of clearly-defined precepts of international law are justified on grounds of necessity. These admittedly illegal and immoral acts are considered as injuries solely by the states immediately concerned. They are not regarded as offences against the unorganized society of nations and hence the states not adversely affected do not feel justified, provided they even be so inclined, either to raise their voices in protest or, still less, to use economic pressure or force against the offender.

This concept of state sovereignty is a predominant characteristic of modern nationalism. It is to a great extent a philosophical and legal fiction inherited from a different past and out of accord with modern facts.² It divides the world into sharply segregated—and from the social and economic standpoint, largely artificial—politico-legal units. Under its sway each one of these states is primarily, if not exclusively, interested in its own welfare and, in pursuing it, tends to disregard the rights and interests of its fellows and to ignore those of mankind as a whole. All states are in varying degrees infected with this self-regarding nationalism, which is the fundamental cause of the present war and which will cause further catastrophes in the future unless the state can be effectively controlled by some form of world-organization. Apparently such a consummation cannot be fully realized for a considerable time, because the sense of international obligation and responsibility—the willingness to forego or even to jeopard national advantage in mutual service for mankind as a whole—is more or less undeveloped in all states.

At one extreme in the world of today is a state like the German Empire which, impelled by the aggressive doctrines of a reactionary economic philosophy and by an almost pagan worship of the God of War and at the same time impressed with its self-imposed task to redeem a decadent world, rides rough-shod over the rights of others. But almost, if not equally, as disastrous to the civilization of the world is such an attitude as that of the United States which, immersed in concern for its own peace and liberty, has adhered to a

² Cf. C. Delisle Burns, *The Morality of Nations*, *passim*; Ch. Seignebos, 1815–1915 (English translation), p. 34; Roland G. Usher, *The Challenge of the Future*, p. 193; John Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, p. 131.

policy of "no foreign entanglements" outside the western hemisphere that is tantamount to a repudiation of all responsibility for maintaining justice and right in interstate relations other than such as directly affect the American continents.

It follows ineluctably from these premises that we of the United States cannot escape a certain degree of negative responsibility for the deplorable chaos into which western civilization has fallen. Although German political philosophy has been widely taught in America by scientists trained in German universities, it cannot be said that its doctrines have become an integral part of general thought. While the organic theory of the state is, as a rule, not questioned, the conclusions that may be drawn from it have not been pushed to their logical extreme. Above all, the complete subordination of the citizen to the state is repugnant to American individualism. Furthermore, in the eyes of most Americans, the German concept of the state as a living personality, with no moral responsibility but to itself, is a metaphysical abstraction corresponding in no degree to actuality. Nor is the German visualization of the world as a group of inherently antagonistic and morally self-sufficient states, each a law unto itself, in accord with American political traditions and ideals. American political thought does not emphasize the value of the state and ignore the rights and importance of mankind as a whole. It inclines towards the concept of a morally responsible state conforming to the public opinion of the as yet unorganized world-community. There is implicit in it the ideal of such an ultimate community based on the essential unity of humanity. Practically nothing effective, however, has been done by the United States to make this ideal an eventual possibility.

By our traditional policy of aloofness from European affairs, we have deliberately refused to assume those obligations that every state owes to mankind. This policy may have been expedient in the days of our weakness, but even then it had some unfortunate consequences that in our provincial outlook are frequently ignored. Absorption in our own development was an unquestionable factor in protracting Europe's struggle against the domination of Napoleon. Writing of that period, Admiral Mahan with characteristic insight pointed out: "The United States, contrary alike to the chief interests of mankind and to her own, sided upon the whole,

though by no means unanimously, against Great Britain."³ The only legitimate defence for such a policy of deliberate isolation is impotence, but the United States steadfastly adhered to this attitude even after it had become one of the Great Powers and it thus forfeited the influence it could and should have exerted upon the affairs of mankind.

It is true that we have in various directions attempted to exert our influence for the advancement of humanity, but except to a limited extent, and then well-nigh exclusively in Central and South America, we have refused to assume any obligations for the application of our political ideals. One does not have to be an adherent of the German theory of force to realize that in international relations, as at present regulated, mere words, unless there is a willingness if necessary to back them up by deeds, are futile. Force alone leads to Prussianism, to the doctrine that might makes right, with its dire consequences both to victor and victim. Words, no matter how cogent be the moral arguments, are on many occasions totally ineffective especially when it is known that there is no intention whatsoever of wielding anything more warlike than the pen. The futility of such a course in the unorganized world of today was sadly realized by Secretary Hay when he was obliged to witness the breakdown of his Chinese policy by Russia's action in Manchuria. In 1903, he wrote to Henry White:

The Chinese, as well as the Russians, seem to know that the strength of our position is entirely moral, and if the Russians are convinced that we will not fight for Manchuria—as I suppose we will not—and the Chinese are convinced that they have nothing but good to expect from us and nothing but a beating from Russia, the open hand will not be so convincing to the poor devils of Chinks as the raised club. Still, we must do the best we can with the means at our disposition."⁴

In that the United States resolutely refused to become involved in any European matters and, furthermore, in that, because of its patent unwillingness to use more than moral suasion, it left to

³ Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution*, II, p. 285. Twenty years ago, Prof. John W. Burgess took American historians to task for passing over "our partiality for the French in the struggle to place a Napoleonic despotism over all continental Europe, which Great Britain was using all her powers to prevent." *Political Science Quarterly* XI, p. 64. See also Richard Olney's remarks in the *Atlantic Monthly* for March of 1900.

⁴ W. R. Thayer, *Life and Letters of John Hay II*, p. 369.

others the protection of its policies in the Far East, we cannot escape a degree of negative responsibility for the existing world-war. An examination of recent international history and of the fundamental aim of German world politics will make this nexus apparent.

There is a disconcerting vagueness about Germany's ambitious plans, but the general underlying thought is unmistakable. When the German statesmen, economists, and publicists tried to pierce the veil of the future and to picture the world toward the end of this century, they saw three great political aggregates—the American, the British, and the Russian—outranking in cultural influence and potential strength all other states of western civilization and dwarfing a Germany whose political growth under existing territorial arrangements could apparently not compete with theirs.⁵ Hence the insistent striving for a repartition of the world in conformity both with Germany's actual military strength and with some hypothetical future need for more land for her growing population as well as for new markets and fresh sources of supply for her expanding industries. There was no question either of any real need or of any actual handicap under existing conditions. As these plans for expansion could be realized only at the expense of the British Empire or of the Monroe Doctrine, the enemy of enemies in German eyes appeared to be the so-called "Anglo-Saxon block." The Anglo-Saxon, says Paul Rohrbach in his widely-read book *Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt*, "have spread over such vast expanses that they seem to be on the point of assuming the cultural control of the world, thanks to their large numbers, their resources and their inborn strength."⁶ Similarly, Maximilian Harden pointed out that "Great Britain and North America tend to form a community of interests. On the two oceans, the Anglo-Saxons of the two continents group themselves together in unity of will. The hegemony of the white race will be theirs, if we do not make up the old quarrel. United with France, we should be invincible on land and sea."⁷ Not only is the cultural solidarity of English-speaking peoples fully recognized, but also the fact that their separate developments have

⁵ On the extensive, but undeveloped, economic possibilities of Germany's African possessions, see Sir Harry Johnston's "The German Colonies," in the *Edinburgh Review* of October of 1914.

⁶ Rohrbach, *German World Policies*, p. 5.

⁷ *Zukunft*, July 1, 1911, quoted in Ch. Andler's *Pan-Germanism*, p. 53.

formed part of what is essentially one historical process. Briefly, the broad purpose of German imperialism is to eject the English-speaking peoples from the prominent positions they have acquired in all continents. What English-speaking pioneers—discoverers, adventurers, traders, and settlers—have slowly and laboriously accomplished largely by individual enterprise, the German Empire with its consciousness of military strength planned to duplicate in a few decades.

This hostile purpose toward the English-speaking peoples first manifested itself plainly during the years when the difficulties between Briton and Boer in South Africa were reaching a climax and when Spain was forced by the United States to relinquish the last remnants of her old colonial empire in the East and West. One direct result of this menace was the significant movement for greater cohesion that has made the British Empire a unit during the present war and which promises, after its conclusion, to lead to the creation of adequate political machinery for the continuous expression of this solidarity. Another simultaneous result, just as truly although somewhat less obviously traceable to the German peril, was the marked increase in friendship between England and the United States and their cordial coöperation in some international questions. A few, very few it is true, isolated Americans urged that this friendship should ripen into an alliance, but against such a proposal stood not only the traditions of aloofness inherited from "The Fathers of the Republic," but also the prejudices of some elements of America's heterogeneous population.⁸ The great mass of the people were immersed in their own diverse affairs and had only the most superficial knowledge of international politics, while their leaders, with lack of courageous foresight, refused to question the traditional

⁸ On June 23, 1900, John Hay wrote to John W. Foster: "What can be done in the present diseased state of the public mind? There is such a mad-dog hatred of England prevalent among newspapers and politicians that anything we should now do in China to take care of our imperiled interests, would be set down to 'subservience to Great Britain'. . . . All I have ever done with England is to have wrung great concessions out of her with no compensation. . . . Every Senator I see says, 'For God's sake, don't let it appear we have any understanding with England.' How can I make bricks without straw? That we should be compelled to refuse the assistance of the greatest power in the world, *in carrying out our own policy*, because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are fools—is enough to drive a man mad." W. R. Thayer, *loc. cit.* II, p. 234.

policy. It was realized by only an infinitesimally small fraction of the American people that what was protecting South America from German ambitions was not so much the Monroe Doctrine as, primarily, British sea power. Had the United States entered into such an alliance, it is more than probable that Germany would have realized the futility of attempting to change the course of history. As a cultural entity "the Anglo-Saxon block" did not seem an insuperable obstacle, but a clearly defined alliance upon this foundation would have given Germany pause. Had such an alliance been consummated some fifteen years ago, the entire course of world history would have been far different and far more conformable to American ideals and interests; and its crowning climax, the present European agony, would in all probability have been avoided. It is for us Americans to ponder over these facts and to ask ourselves whether we can claim entire dissociation from the slaughter on Europe's blood-stained fields. The world is so closely interrelated that no great state can selfishly decline to assume the obligations resulting from membership in the world-community without disastrous consequences not only to others but in the end to itself as well.

Great Britain is the centre of a vast political aggregate, misleadingly designated as an empire but rapidly developing into a genuine commonwealth of diverse nations and races.⁹ It covers approximately one-fifth of the world's area and includes somewhat more than one-quarter of mankind. Its foreign commerce is in volume even more than proportionately extensive. On account of these facts every political change throughout the entire world must necessarily in some way or other affect the British Empire. Its foreign policy during the past fifteen years has been completely dominated by the German menace. This has been the determining factor in recent international history and explains many apparently unconnected events in Africa, China, Persia, the Balkans, and Asiatic Turkey. The main object of British policy was security and all efforts were made to avert a European war into which the British Empire would inevitably be drawn. The plan adopted to prevent the impending German attack was to settle all outstanding disputes with other states and to create a diplomatic combination that would hold Germany back. At the same time, a conciliatory policy

⁹ See Philip H. Kerr's "Commonwealth and Empire" in *The Empire and the Future* (Macmillan, 1916).

was pursued toward Germany and extensive concessions were made to her.

After the Agadir crisis of 1911, which had brought Europe to the verge of war, England set seriously about the task of meeting Germany's demands for expansion. As the Belgian Minister in London at that time wrote: "Ce qui est certain est que le but que l'on a en vue est pacifique. On voudrait à tout prix diminuer la tension existante entre les deux pays. . . . L'Angleterre est disposée à ne plus contrecarrer l'Allemagne dans les questions secondaires, mais on ne doit pas lui disputer la suprématie sur mer."¹⁰ The negotiations were carried on in this spirit and shortly before the outbreak of the war there had been concluded agreements that gave Germany practically a free hand in the economic exploitation of Mesopotamia,¹¹ and removed British opposition to a rearrangement of the African map to meet Germany's ambitious requirements. Even so ardent an expansionist as Paul Rohrbach was jubilant and surprised over the outcome of these negotiations.¹²

In the course of this policy many important British interests were sacrificed and some political principles were jettisoned, but apparently the only other alternative was a world-war, and that was England's nightmare. This was of course patent to Germany but, in addition, Britain's friends and allies fully realized it and some did not hesitate to take advantage of the situation. In 1911, Russia unquestionably violated the spirit of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, whose intent was to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia in their then existing status, and she was able to do so with impunity because tension at that time between England and Russia would have been Germany's signal for bringing about a general European war. W. Morgan Shuster's brief and tumultuous career in Persia was exactly synchronous with the Agadir crisis in Europe. Similarly, the German peril tied England's hands when, prior to the present war, Russia and Japan were firmly establishing themselves in Mongolia and in Manchuria.¹³

¹⁰ Belgische Aktenstuecke, 1905-1914, p. 105.

¹¹ Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, June 29, 1914.

¹² Rohrbach, *Zum Weltvolk hindurch!*, pp. 47, 48; Rohrbach, *Germany's Isolation*, pp. 130, 131. See also "The Anglo-German Negotiations in 1914," in *The New Republic* of December 18, 1915.

¹³ J. O. P. Bland, "The Future of China," in the *Edinburgh Review* for October of 1914; J. F. Abbott, *Japanese Expansion and American Policies*, pp. 66-71.

The entire policy of England during the past decade was unquestionably what Professor Keutgen of Hamburg dubbed it: "Eine Politik der Schwache." Its very weakness, its almost openly avowed pacifism, convinced Germany that England was a negligible factor and in this way it conduced to bringing about the war whose fundamental purpose it was to avert. On the other hand, Sir Edward Grey's policy of a defensive coalition was based upon a fuller realization of the imminence and gravity of the German menace than obtained in most well informed quarters in England and it succeeded in keeping intact a diplomatic group of such strength as will in all likelihood be able to thwart the German plan of world domination.

During the course of these vicissitudes of the past decade, not a few things were done which were repugnant to the American conscience. But our government, pursuing its traditional course, was silent; and the vehement complaints of a few individual Americans totally ignored the question whether or no their country might have had some duty in the premises. In the complacency of our negative rectitude, we have never contemplated the undeniable fact that those who might have prevented these deeds in the Balkans, China, Persia, and elsewhere were wellnigh helpless so long as the United States adhered to its policy of self-regarding isolation. In addition, definite American interests were prejudiced. The policy of the open-door in China could not be maintained by England alone without breaking up the European defensive combination against Germany and the knowledge that we would under no circumstances use more than moral suasion rendered our advocacy of this policy ineffective. A reconstruction of what the past might have been had we been willing to assume obligations for the welfare of the world is not a futile pastime but a valuable object lesson for the present and for the future.

Today Europe is in the throes of an agonizing war, in which the future of civilization is at stake. All the fundamental questions arising from artificial boundary lines based upon political and military considerations and resulting in suppressed and exploited nationalities are in the crucible. In the days of Louis XIV and of Napoleon, the fundamental issue was whether or no Europe, primarily, was to be saved from the domination of one supreme military power. But the present struggle involves not only the freedom

of Europe, but in addition, that of the whole world, for the attempted hegemony of Europe was to serve as the basis for German mastery of the other continents. German ambitions avowedly looked to an extra-European goal. Furthermore, although it cannot be said that the war is one of autocracy upon democracy, for Russia is allied with the liberal Great Powers, yet the future of democracy is vitally involved in the outcome. For, in a world so unorganized politically that its peace is at the mercy of one Power, the crucial test of any form of social organization cannot be the more or less satisfactory character of its internal political life, but must perforce be its ability to defend itself and to survive in a struggle imposed by others. Were European democracy to fail in this crisis, its fate would be sealed and America would become the last bulwark of free government. For this fundamental reason, there is an almost literal truth in the statement that the Allies are fighting America's battles.

The American people has some vague perception that the most far-reaching issues are at stakes, but it has seemingly only the faintest realization of the extent to which the future of the United States is contingent upon the defeat of German ambitions. As a result Americans, although predominantly pro-Allies in sentiment, do not see that their own interests not only warrant but even demand participation in the struggle. Naturally, with the still undeveloped sense of responsibility for the welfare of the rest of the world, the cause of civilization in itself makes no compelling appeal. Hence the United States is overwhelmingly averse from being drawn into the war, and the official neutrality maintained by Washington is an accurate expression of the will of the great mass of the people. In the eyes of not a few there seems to be something dignified in this neutrality, as if the United States were placed in the position of a judge appraising the actions of the warring nations. Others pride themselves on some moral quality supposedly inherent in an attitude of neutrality. A little reflection would, however, demonstrate that there is no warrant whatsoever for such sentiments. Neutrality is essentially passive and is a right or privilege sanctioned by international usage, but it is in no sense a moral duty. Obviously, a great Power which, in a crisis that is determining the destiny of the world, and hence also its own future, deliberately remains passive and refrains from aiding what it considers to be the cause of civilization is by this inaction placed upon the moral defensive. Its neu-

trality, instead of being, as is generally assumed, *a priori* meritorious, requires justification if it is to escape condemnation. Whether this justification will commend itself to the judgment of the future is another matter. At all events, a daily increasing number of those Americans that can think independently have reached the conclusion that the rigidly negative neutrality of our government is doing violence to the best instincts of American idealism and is causing progressive demoralization.

What has been neglected in the past cannot be altered; nor can a nation trained for generations to look within change its self-centred attitude in a day. But the past and present may serve as warnings to make America's future part in the world a more useful and ennobling one. The war has directed the attention of thinking America to problems that formerly seemed almost academically remote. In some, the horrors of the war have produced such a revulsion that they are seeking what seems to them to be salvation in a Pan-Americanism which in their eyes means renewed and reinforced isolation in this hemisphere. They are ready to relinquish the Philippines, to abandon China to whatever fate the ambitions of others may allot to her and, under the spell of a somewhat fetichistic republicanism, they desire "to complete and round out the immunity from entangling foreign alliances proposed by Washington and Monroe, by asking our European friends to liberate all territory in any of the Americas now held by them."¹⁴ Canada, of course, is excepted. They wish to carry to its logical conclusion Secretary Olney's dictum that any permanent political union between a European and an American state is "unnatural and inexpedient," and to make real the Pan-American unity that John Quincy Adams and Clay planned and which Blaine energetically fostered. But the solidarity upon which this unity is premised is largely fictitious in its spiritual, cultural, political, economic, and even in its geographical elements. The cultural and economic ties between Europe and America are far stronger than those binding together the Americas.¹⁵ English-speaking, the so-called Anglo-Saxon, America and Latin America are not mere geographical terms

¹⁴ Charles H. Sherrill, *Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine*, p. 139. Cf. pp. 136, 137.

¹⁵ Cf. James Bryce, *South America*, chap. XIV; F. Garcia Caldeón, *Les Démocraties Latines de l'Amérique*, *passim*.

but express vital social facts. To ignore this is to court disaster. Hence many, while favoring Pan-Americanism as a step forward toward internationalism, deem it dangerous to the extent that it tends to ignore the interdependence of Europe and America. This interdependence has been conspicuously emphasized by the war. As a consequence, ever growing numbers of Americans have rejected the gospel of renewed isolation and of artificial seclusion in the western hemisphere, and have reached the conclusion that the policy of aloofness from European affairs is obsolete and that we must in the future assume our share of the burden of upholding the public right of the world. Various influential movements, such as the proposed "League to Enforce Peace" and the widespread demand for military and naval preparedness, indicate a radical change in our attitude toward foreign policy and a deeper insight into the dynamics of international relations. But while it is generally assumed that we are destined, whether we like it or not, to be drawn more and more into the international field, there has been little discussion of the part that we are to play. Shall we remain free from all entanglements, shall we merely promise diplomatic support in certain contingencies, or shall we enter into definite alliances? Furthermore, shall our future military preparations be merely sufficient to prevent a successful invasion of the United States, or shall they be adequate to protect our growing interests in foreign lands?

Naturally the decision on all these points will be vitally affected by the future course of the war and by the settlement that follows it. Whatever these may be, it seems certain that the present general alignment of the Powers will for some time after the close of the war be continued in the diplomatic and economic spheres and that, if the United States is to have an effective voice and its interests are to be adequately considered, we must join one or the other group. Isolated, the United States would be defenceless and without influence. It would be folly to overlook the fact that the part played by a neutral in a world-wide internecine war cannot arouse friendly feelings among any of the belligerents. The Central Empires are unquestionably incensed at the purchase by the Allies of supplies in America, and there is this to be said for their attitude that, already before the war, they had held that a non-combatant state could not become an extensive source of such supplies without violating its

neutrality.¹⁶ Furthermore, these Powers have protested against our not obliging the Allies to permit American raw materials and foodstuffs to reach them and their case is strengthened by the fact that we have to some extent accepted their view of the international law applicable in these instances. According to not irresponsible reports, that are inherently far from improbable, a bill of damages is being prepared in Germany which will make even the indirect Alabama claims as massed in Sumner's exuberant imagination appear insignificant. On the other hand, while the Entente Allies are grateful for sympathy and fully appreciate the personal services rendered by many Americans both in the field and in relief work, they realize how insignificant all this is in view of the importance to America of their ultimate victory. Nor do they feel under any obligation for our selling to them at enormously inflated prices arms and ammunition, as well as raw materials, whose proceeds are not only enriching us but also bringing about a virtual economic revolution to their detriment. Furthermore, they resent that they have had somewhat to restrict the full pressure of their sea power out of deference to our rights as neutrals. In a conflict of this scope and intensity, the belligerents cannot, without doing violence to human nature, nourish kindly feelings toward the neutral who profits by their distress.

If the United States should be thus friendless and isolated after the war, the consequences would certainly be serious and might possibly be disastrous. Our foreign policy is preëminently devoted to two objects, the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and the maintenance of the open-door in China. Both have idealistic as well as economic phases. Our aim is to preserve South and Central America free from foreign domination so that the twenty republics located there may develop their characteristic institutions unhampered by outside dictation. The corollary to the Monroe Doctrine is Pan-Americanism, which is not a national policy of the United States but an American international movement to foster closer spiritual, political, and economic relations between all the

¹⁶ The German *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege* states this explicitly. See J. H. Morgan, *The German War Book*, p. 148. This contention was the basis of the Austro-Hungarian protest of June 29, 1915. Department of State, *European War No. 2*, p. 193. See also the German Memorandum of April 4, 1914. *Ibid.*, No. 1, pp. 73, 74.

Americas. Similarly, in China, our aim is not merely to preserve and widen a market for our goods, but to keep intact the political independence and administrative integrity of that backward country with its swarming millions.

The most disturbing feature about Germany's much advertised "place in the sun" was its apparently deliberate vagueness. It was nowhere and everywhere. Whenever in any quarter of the globe the political waters became troubled, Germany extemporized vital interests in whose protection she was ready to shake the mailed fist. The policy of Napoleon III in demanding compensation for France whenever Prussia added to its power, has been justly denounced by German historians as vicious, but the same policy has in turn been adopted by United Germany and has kept the world in a continuous ferment. German militarism and diplomacy have for two decades been the incubus of Europe. It is obvious that if ever a new Germany over the seas is to arise, the most likely, if not the only possible place is Brazil, in whose southern states there is already a considerable German nucleus around which to build such a daughter-nation. German economists and publicists have persistently painted this dream.¹⁸ Against its realization, however, stood as insuperable barrier, not alone the Monroe Doctrine, but in first line, the British fleet. The grave danger is that after the war, an unchastened and unbeaten, though not victorious, Germany may seek to retrieve its fortunes by annexing Southern Brazil. A well-known English historian, J. Holland Rose, has already spoken sympathetically of this plan¹⁹ and it may be that England, weary of the incessant wrangling and not averse from having German ambitions deflected from Africa and Asia, will no longer interpose her fleet as barrier. As Professor Usher has said, "the easiest concession for the Allies to make will be the control of Asia Minor by Germany and Austria and a free hand for both in South America, leaving Great Britain and France still supreme in Africa and Asia."²⁰ What Americans must bear in mind is

¹⁸ For some details of the voluminous literature on this subject, see: *German Ambitions* (New York, 1903); Ch. Andler, *Pan-Germanism*; F. Garcia Calderón, *Les Démocraties Latines de l'Amérique*, pp. 269-273.

¹⁹ J. H. Rose, *The Origins of the War*, p. 188. See also Moreton Frewen's "The Monroe Doctrine and the Great War" in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, of February, 1916.

²⁰ R. G. Usher, *The Challenge of the Future*, p. 231. See also pp. 314, 315.

that their country as a body politic has as yet done nothing during the war which entitles it to special consideration from the belligerents.

Such difficulties and others of a similar nature in the Far East confront us unless we emerge from our voluntary isolation and join hands with other nations. But more than mere general moral coöperation and more than mere active support in specific instances are necessary if in the future war is to be avoided and at the same time our interests and the independence of South America and of China are to be preserved. It is plain even to the most casual observer that Japan is at present attempting to gain a predominant economic and political position in China. The ultimate success of this attempt will depend primarily upon whether or no England after the war will be in such a position that in opposing Japan she can afford to run the risk of that country joining the Central Empires. In making her decision, our attitude in this special instance will count for little or nothing with England; the main consideration will be the general balance of the Powers in Europe. Our active support merely in one isolated case, with otherwise a general adherence to our policy of aloofness, would be no compensation for a possible defection of Japan to the Teutonic Powers. Whether or no China's fate is to be determined by the same circumstances as was Persia's rests mainly with us.

It is obvious that the only Powers with whom our political traditions and our material interests would permit active coöperation are the present Allies of the Quadruple Entente and among them England would naturally be the one to whom our common civilization would draw us most closely. An alliance of the United States with the British Empire on clearly defined terms, made in the open light of the day, would effectively secure the future peace of the world and its development along progressively democratic lines. Continuous coöperation is necessary, but a mere entente would not be sufficient, as has been proven by this war. For, had Germany been faced with the certainty of England entering the war, she would probably not have forced matters as she did. Similarly, the expression "British Empire" is used advisedly, as one of the results of the war bids fair to be such a reorganization of this vast commonwealth as will give the great self-governing dominions—of which New Zealand and Australia are the world's most ad-

vanced democracies²¹—an important part in the framing of foreign policy.

For such a defensive alliance, clearly defined as to its scope, there are firm spiritual and political foundations. Both branches of the politically separated, but culturally united, English-speaking race have essentially the same political institutions and ideals. In both an unfettered public opinion, basing its judgments upon the dictates of personal morality, as a rule obliges the government in its conduct of foreign affairs to conform to standards that are not generally recognized elsewhere. Without disparaging any other state, it may be confidently said that of all the Great Powers these are the only ones not infected with dreams of military glory or with ambitions of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of others. With them alone is peace the genuine goal of policy. As a result, the general foreign policy of the British Empire and that of the United States follow parallel lines. The fundamental aim of both states is security, but security does not mean merely safety from invasion. In these days of rapid communication and of ever closer economic interdependence of the world, security implies in addition the protection of a nation's interests in other countries.

For the United States, security both in the narrower and in the broader sense is obviously contingent, in the main, upon sea power. But this power is an economic fact that cannot be improvised. It may be most readily secured by an alliance with the British Empire whose control of the seas rests, in ultimate analysis, not upon a navy that any nation sufficiently rich might duplicate, but upon the fact that its mercantile marine is somewhat in excess of 43 per cent of the world's total tonnage.²² As a result of this fact alone, apart from the existing economic interdependence and the extensive common frontier, friendship and coöperation with the British Empire is imperative. When Canning suggested to Rush, our Minister at London, the policy that led to the formulation and enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, he said that he did not think that concert of action would be necessary, believing that the knowledge that Great Britain and the United States were of the same opinion would by its moral effect prevent European interference in South America.

²¹ Cf. Franz Oppenheimer, *The State* p. 19.

²² American Whitaker 1916, p. 74. For further details, see *ibid.*, pp. 215 ff; *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1915*, pp. 50* ff; *Statesman's Year Book 1915*, pp. lv, 81 ff.

This belief was founded, Canning said, "upon the large share of the maritime power of the world which Great Britain and the United States shared between them, and the consequent influence which the knowledge of their common policy could not fail to produce on the rest of the world." When at this time, Monroe turned to Jefferson for advice, the aged statesman replied: "Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one or all on earth, and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world." The situation is essentially the same today.²³ The successful and peaceful maintenance of our policies toward Latin America and toward China depends largely upon British support.

"Man is a creature," said Robert Louis Stevenson, "who lives not upon bread alone, but principally by catchwords," and we as a nation have been markedly prone to believe in the efficacy of phrases. The strength of the Monroe Doctrine has from the very outset been derived from British sea power. Whether it will continue to do so depends largely upon our willingness to form an alliance with the British Empire. In so far as this doctrine is concerned, the general interests and political ideals of both countries coincide. There is no likelihood of friction provided we do not adopt the reactionary policy of using the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism to secure by treaty or otherwise special and exclusive privileges that would shut the door to British commerce.²⁴ If we frankly agreed to a self-denying ordinance to this effect and at the same time assumed responsibility²⁵—as apparently we are to do—for some measure of order and justice in the disturbed parts of Central and South America, England's extensive economic interests in those regions, created by centuries of enterprise, would be amply

²³ "While England as the mistress of the sea would be our most formidable adversary, she could also be our most useful friend and her friendship is of as much importance to us as is ours to her." *American Foreign Policy*. By a Diplomat (Boston, 1909), p. 49.

²⁴ Such a perversion of Pan-Americanism would probably have serious consequences. See Sir Harry Johnston, *Common Sense in Foreign Policy*, pp. 15, 16, 88 ff.

²⁵ In 1895, during the Venezuela difficulty, Salisbury denied that the United States was "entitled to affirm as a universal proposition with reference to a number of independent States, *for whose conduct it assumes no responsibility*, that its interests are necessarily concerned in whatever may befall those states simply because they are situated in the Western Hemisphere."

safeguarded. Under such conditions, the Monroe Doctrine would unquestionably secure the British Empire's full support.

Nor is there any conflict between an Anglo-American alliance and Pan-Americanism. When, some ninety years ago, this vision first took hold of men, one of its ardent advocates, the great liberator, Bolivar, believed that England should take a prominent part in any union of the American nations.²⁶ And today a Pan-Americanism that excludes the British Empire—an American power of rank second only to the United States—is unwisely narrow. Similarly, in China, there are no prospective points of friction. Apart from the disinterested desire of both peoples to see the hitherto stationary civilization of that backward country conform to progressive standards, British and American interests are limited to seeing that their commerce is not discriminated against by tariffs and railway rates that give an unfair advantage to their competitors.

But aside both from the general obligation of every state to see that justice and order obtain in the world and also from the demands of national self-interest, there is one additional most potent argument for an Anglo-American alliance. Hitherto, not as a result of any virtues innate in them, but rather by the fortunate accident of position, the English-speaking peoples have been able to escape the burdens and dangers of large military establishments. Apparently if they do not coöperate in protective measures, neither will be thus fortunate in the future. The tendency of every human instrument is to seek occasion to demonstrate its effectiveness and the existence of a powerful army leads insensibly to an aggressive attitude toward other states. It also inclines toward the establishment of a military caste that is not subject to the civil law. Furthermore, it frequently results in the subordination of policy to military considerations and to the control of the body politic by the military authorities. These evils of militarism are most clearly exemplified in modern Germany. The notorious Zabern affair²⁷ was an inevitable manifestation of a system that gives the Reichstag virtually no control over the army.²⁸ In 1906, Colonel von Deimling frankly told the Reichstag that its decision counted for

²⁶ Bolivar's Code of Pan-Americanism, in *New York Times Magazine* of March 26, 1916.

²⁷ W. H. Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany?* pp. 124-130.

²⁸ Hans Delbrueck, *Regierung und Volkswille*, p. 136.

naught and that he would never withdraw a single soldier from South Africa, "unless my Emperor issues a command to that effect."²⁹ Equally significant is the fact that the German Foreign Office, had it been so inclined, was powerless to prevent the invasion of Belgium after it had become apparent that such action would bring England into the war. On August 5, 1914, the German Under-Secretary of State informed the Belgian Minister at Berlin that "le Département des Affaires Etrangères était impuissant. Depuis que l'ordre de mobilisation avait été lancé par l'Empereur, tous les pouvoirs appartiennent à l'autorité militaire. C'était elle qui avait jugé que l'invasion de la Belgique était une opération de guerre indispensable."³⁰

Militarism is of course not synonymous with preparedness, but the menace of the former is inherent in the latter. Already we are told that civilians should unquestioningly and uncritically accept the decisions of the General Staff as to the requisite size of our army. The great advantage of an Anglo-American alliance is that its main reliance would be an invincible sea power. Except to a very minor degree, none of the insidious dangers of militarism are to be feared from a strong navy. Even in the most powerful navies, comparatively few men are required. The British Navy, abnormally enlarged as it was already before the war by the German peril, included then only 150,000 men. Hence its political influence must be relatively negligible. Moreover, a fleet is essentially a defensive weapon. Sea power can prevent an opponent from being victorious and is thus frequently the decisive factor in hostilities, but in an offensive war it is merely the adjunct of the army. "Navalism" and "Marinism" are misleading—and incidentally barbarous—expressions that have been invented since the war to divert attention from something radically different—German militarism.

It is almost axiomatic that the military and naval forces of any nation should be commensurate not only with its policies but also with its alliances and less formal understandings with other states. It is evident that if the United States remains in isolation and free from what are popularly known as foreign entanglements, the extent of its military preparedness must be far greater than if it were allied

²⁹ Evans Lewin, *The Germans and Africa*, p. 123.

³⁰ *Royaume de Belgique, Correspondence Diplomatique 1914-1915, II*, p. 45. See also Baron Beyens, *L'Allemagne avant la Guerre*, p. 112.

with the British Empire. England is in a similar position. In any eventuality, the old days of comparatively light burdens will probably not return for some time. But the weight of the future load will largely depend upon whether such an alliance is made. Only in this way can security be safeguarded with armaments of such an extent as not to endanger the political institutions typical of English-speaking peoples. With the aid of comparatively small armies recruited from a manhood extensively trained to arms, their joint navies should be fully able not only to protect them but to secure the general peace of the world. Local wars may still occur in Europe (and elsewhere as well) but as in the case of the existing conflict, so in all probability also in all future international difficulties tending toward world-wars, the fundamental causes will lie in extra-European conditions. Before the war, the French of Alsace-Lorraine, the Danes of Schleswig, and the Poles of the eastern provinces had taught Germany the futility of annexing unwilling European peoples. The course of military events may forcibly close Germany's eyes to this lesson and, by proving how impossible is her dream of world-empire, may divert her restless energies toward the East and Southeast of Europe. If so, the old lesson will probably have to be learned anew.

An effective alliance between the British Empire and the United States would mean the harmonious coöperation of one-third of the population of the globe, of whom about 155 millions are Caucasians of the most progressive and democratic type. When, about a year ago at Oxford, Lord Milner advocated such an alliance before an American audience, one of his auditors is reported to have objected that it would be unfair to the other nations. Unquestionably in the case of aggressive peoples, such a combination might be a menace. The argument, however, would have been more cogent before the events of the past twenty months. In view of the military developments during this interval, it is quixotically absurd. Until some system of world-organization is established, the English-speaking peoples must place main reliance upon their united strength to withstand the dangers to which their common civilization is still exposed.

Such an alliance made merely for defensive purposes and seeking to secure peace, order, and justice throughout the world would facilitate the formation of some organization for the still inchoate

world-community. It would naturally attract to itself the nations of like mind and could be made the foundation-stone for that federation of all the world of which statesmen, philosophers, and poets have dreamt. But before such an event can even come within the range of practical politics, the prevailing concept of unlimited state sovereignty must be greatly modified. Though the individual's complete liberty of action is theoretically restricted by his membership in the state, it is only by means of it that he can find the true freedom essential to his fullest development. Similarly, the state is part of a real but still unorganized world-community and it cannot without devitalizing its life seek to evade the responsibilities resulting from this fact.³¹ Ultimately, it is hoped, Mazzini's dream will come true and the self-regarding nationalism of the present day will be replaced by a world-system of which each unit shall be dedicated to the mutual service of mankind as a whole.³² The initial step toward this goal cannot, however, be said to have been taken until Great Powers like the United States are ready to emerge from their self-regarding isolation and to contract binding and durable ties with those of like mind for the maintenance of the public right of the world.

³¹ "Present facts, then, demand the recognition of continuous and normal interdependence of States. The nature of the State is to be understood, at least in part, from its relations with other States: and all philosophies which even imply that the State is isolated are out of date. Indeed, one may say that the modern State *must* be understood by this external reference. In the same sense the individual cannot be understood in isolation, but only by continual reference to society or to his relations with other individuals." C. Delisle Burns, *The Morality of Nations*, p. 50. See also p. 158.

³² Although no writer of modern times has done more to glorify the nation, Mazzini did not regard it as the final unity. In his eyes "a nation is guilty of 'the grand refusal' if it do not stand forward and take its place, to the limit of its power, in international politics. In this, and nothing short of this, lies for him the final justification of national existence. . . . Hence his exhortations to the United States (in 1854) to play its part in world politics." J. Maceunn, *Six Radical Thinkers*, pp. 208, 209.